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By Mercedes Cardona and Rosalind Z. Wiggins 
  
Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed 
to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became 
deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The ten-member bipartisan commission, charged 
with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and 
interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page 
report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, 
and the public. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Borzekowski. 
Pay attention to unusual activity and new patterns, even if you think they are 
innocuous.  
One of Borzekowski’s roles at the FCIC was to author a chapter of the report, The Story of a 
Mortgage Security: Inside CMLTI 2006-NC2, which meticulously tracks an individual 
mortgage through to securitization in a mortgage-backed security and then a collateralized 
debt security (CDO). The result is a step-by-step history showing how the developments in 
the mortgage market, such as changes in underwriting standards, and securitization, 
contributed greatly to the crisis.  
When asked to comment on the significance of The Story of a Mortgage Security and what it 
revealed, Borzekowski described how consumer groups had been raising red flags, pointing 
to warning signs in the sub-prime mortgage market, years before the market hit crisis stage. 
The Story of a Mortgage Security reveals exactly how this product and market developed in 
detail that may not have been fully understood at the time, explained Borzekowski.  
 Borzekowski continued by saying that it can be difficult for regulators to see some early 
warning signs because they do not always emerge in the large data sets that are usually 
examined by state or national regulators. “From the point of view of regulators who are often 
looking at the aggregate statistics, some of those harms—some of those warning flags—are 
going to get lost,” he said. By looking more closely at large data sets, Borzekowski suggested, 
regulators may be able to spot developing problems. 
In order to avoid being caught unprepared for the next crisis, he further urged regulators to 
pay closer attention to what starts as anecdotal evidence, because doing so can help to 
identify issues and looming risks that could snowball into real problems, but which may not 
be easily detected from data sets. Borzekowski also suggested that regulators should 
exercise some level of skepticism and curiosity around what generates such anecdotes and 
whether they might be evidence of a developing systemic issue that might require regulatory 




Borzekowski believes that regulators should also focus on identifying anomalous 
developments—such as a particular instrument becoming a major source of credit for 
particular markets—and digging deeper into understanding such developments. This might 
require going against a natural inclination to accept that everything is okay because the 
markets are doing well, he said. But he firmly believes that regulators “should distrust [their] 
instincts to say ‘everything’s okay’ in the good times, and dig deeper.”  
Incorporating lessons learned from the commission’s report and the crisis into 
ongoing practices will better prepare us for the future. 
Implementing lessons learned from the crisis is critical to future preparation, Borzekowski 
shared. One of the findings that the Commission’s report cited that contributed to the crisis 
was the fragmentation of the financial regulatory system and the lack of interagency 
coordination regarding large institutions. Borzekowski views the development since the 
crisis of new entities that facilitate information-sharing within and among agencies as very 
valuable to addressing this issue: 
Organizations such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council and Office of Financial 
Research are necessary and useful to maintain interagency information sharing. They 
can foster an environment of vigilance in order to spot red flags and prevent future 
meltdowns.  
Borzekowski also viewed these structural developments as particularly important to 
maintaining continuity of perspective and organizational memory as new generations of 
regulators who “had not been there that Friday night when a bank failed” take over. He 
pointed out that regulators who have lived through crises might tend to be more willing to 
look carefully at a firm and may be more willing to use supervisory authorities and other 
tools at their disposal. However, Borzekowski explained, with the passing of time, later 
regulators, who did not share this experience, may not have the same sense of urgency, 
which could lead them to different judgments. 
Borzekowski also pointed to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new 
agency created after the crisis by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, as an example of how lessons 
from the crisis can be implemented.  
Borzekowski, who joined the CFPB as Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of Research in 
2011, described how the CFPB learned to build communications channels between 
supervisory functions and enforcement functions, and research and policy functions. The 
commission “had a very open door to anybody,” he said. “I worked very hard to build a pretty 
porous border between our research office and the academic community that was working 
on consumer finance so we could share ideas, data, and research findings.” He also shared 
that Director Richard Cordray met with industry groups, industry participants, consumer 
advocates, consumer groups, and other research organizations.  
A lot of those institutional aspects of the bureau, I think we got very right. The notion 
that you can bring information and facts that the agency is learning to the public, and 
then, also across divisions within the agency, is a really strong model. 
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Information sharing must be done carefully in this regulatory framework to respect the 
agencies’ supervisory process and industry confidentiality, pointed out Borzekowski. But he 
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